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Abstract 
∎ Trade agreements can contribute to long term development – and thus 
to addressing the causes of flight and migration – as long as they consist-
ently pursue sustainable development and real market opening. 
∎ The latest theoretical and empirical findings highlight the enormous 
complexity of the relationship between trade and migration. Other factors 
(such as war, economic crisis etc.) often play a larger role as triggers of 
migration than trade policy and trade agreements. 
∎ One aspect is incontestable: Migration always has a positive effect on 
trade flows. 
∎ Conversely, the effect of trade agreements on migration is sometimes 
positive, sometimes negative: If they lead to increasing per capita income 
they may temporarily stimulate migration. A certain level of income is 
required before people are able to emigrate at all. 
∎ Using trade agreements to create legal migration opportunities in the area 
of services reduces the incentive for irregular migration. This question is 
especially relevant for the EU, as it faces the looming problem of labour 
shortages in the ageing societies of its member states. 
∎ Ecological and social aspects of investment and trade should be better 
integrated in all free trade agreements. South Africa and the countries of 
North Africa offer the greatest potential to expand market access. The EU 
has already completely opened its markets to most sub-Saharan countries. 
∎ The respective policy instruments for trade and migration need to be 
better coordinated in order to reduce the contradictions between them 
and to address justified concerns about uncontrolled immigration. 
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Issues and Recommendations 
Connections between Trade Policy and 
Migration. A Sphere of Action for the EU 
The political debate about migration and flight 
touches on all spheres of policy. To what extent can 
policy contribute to stemming migration flows? Or 
does it function as a catalyst or even a trigger? These 
questions also apply to trade policy, even if there has 
been almost no research to date into the connection 
between trade policy and migration with respect to 
“combating the causes of refugee movements”. One 
reason for this is that neoclassical international trade 
theory posits a clear and unambiguous relationship 
between the two: trade leads to wage convergence 
and this lessens the incentive to migrate. However, 
more recent theories and empirical observations both 
suggest that the relationship is a great deal more com-
plex. Another hindrance to research is that the effects 
of trade policy instruments are almost impossible to 
isolate from other factors, such as internal and exter-
nal circumstances, wars, climate change, economic 
crises etc. 
One relationship is uncontested: Migration always 
has a positive effect on trade flows, increasing exports 
and imports especially in the receiving country. A 
second is more ambivalent: it is assumed that inter-
national trade reduces the causes of migration in the 
long term, by contributing to economic growth and 
thus to sustainable development. This does not mean, 
however, that trade and growth necessarily and auto-
matically reduce migration movements. Research into 
the “migration hump” shows that growth in poor 
countries initially spurs migration, with a reduction 
coming only after a minimum income threshold has 
been crossed. Moreover, trade liberalisation only gen-
erates economic growth under specific conditions. 
Whether trade liberalisation encourages or deters 
migration thus depends largely on the specific details 
of trade policy and free trade agreements: Are they 
appropriate to the country’s level of development and 
economic structure? Do they rapidly increase exports 
while setting limits to negative structural change? 
What are their effects on internal distribution issues? 
Do they contribute to raising social and ecological 
standards in the long term? Are there accompanying 
reforms in other policy areas? 
Issues and Recommendations 
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At the same time, trade policy has itself become an 
instrument for enabling legal migration. The cumber-
some designation for this is “supply of services by 
natural persons”, introduced in 1995 when the mem-
ber states of the World Trade Organisation agreed on 
this as one of four forms of international trade in 
services. The European Union has a growing interest 
in this area, where it hopes that concessions can win 
it better market access outside of Europe (for goods as 
well as services). Other motives are also involved: the 
expectation that possibilities for legal migration will 
help to make irregular migration less attractive, as 
well as the EU’s vital interest in securing the long-
term labour resources needed by the ageing societies 
of its member states. Trade policy offers a channel 
for pursuing these objectives. One reason why it has 
rarely been used to date is that trade agreements lack 
instruments for dealing satisfactorily with the non-
economic and societal concerns of destination coun-
tries in connection with migration questions. The 
instruments of migration policy devote much greater 
attention to these. It is therefore obvious to more 
closely link together the instruments of trade and 
migration policy. But migration should not be subject 
to conditionality in trade agreements, such as obli-
gations to take back irregular migrants. That would 
fundamentally undermine the actual objectives of 
trade agreements. 
If one examines the European Union’s trade policy 
instruments for Africa against that background, sev-
eral conclusions can be drawn. Firstly, it is important 
to grant African states access to the EU market for 
products that they are actually capable of exporting. 
Although most countries in Sub-Saharan Africa 
already enjoy free access to the EU market, there is 
room for improvement in relation to South Africa 
and the North African states. Secondly, trade agree-
ments must seek to promote sustainable economic 
growth in the partner countries. Whether the EU’s 
economic partnership agreements (EPAs) with African 
states offer adequate and sufficiently flexible re-
sponses to negative effects of trade liberalisation 
remains to be seen in the course of their implemen-
tation. Aid for trade can contribute to increasing 
exports and supporting their development effects. 
Thirdly, development goals need to be addressed 
more earnestly in trade agreements with North 
African states; the EPAs can serve as a model in some 
respects. Fourthly, future deepenings of the agree-
ments offer opportunities to foreground the social 
and ecological aspects of trade and production. 
Fifthly, legal possibilities for migration can be created 
through trade agreements in the area of services. A 
meaningful linkage of the instruments of migration 
and trade policy would be helpful, as would closer 
cooperation with the private sector. 
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The so-called “refugee crisis” of 2015 pushed the topic 
of migration to the top of European political agenda. 
Since then all policy areas have been up for scrutiny. 
To what extent do they contribute to addressing the 
causes of forced displacement or, conversely, encour-
age people to leave their homeland? The underlying 
question here is that of coherence between migration 
policy and other policy areas. Discussion is especially 
intense around trade policy, as a sphere of globalisa-
tion that is known to produce losers as well as win-
ners.1 Fundamentally, the relationships between 
international trade and cross-border labour migration 
are elementary to macro-economic theory. 
Trade theory makes no distinction between differ-
ent forms of migration. When discussing the connec-
tions with trade, this study uses the International 
Organisation for Migration’s definition of migration: 
“The movement of persons away from their place of 
usual residence, either across an international border 
or within a State.”2 Here, however, the discussion is 
confined to international migration. More specific 
manifestations are introduced where relevant and 
necessary, in particular legal labour migration under 
international agreements. To address the deficits of 
international trade theory – whose narrow assump-
tions exclude important aspects of the possible rela-
tionships between trade and migration – the inves-
 
1 See Evita Schmieg, “Europäische Handelspolitik: Fördert 
oder verhindert sie Migrationsbewegungen?” in Fluchtursachen 
“Made in Europe”: Über europäische Politik und ihren Zusammen-
hang mit Migration und Flucht, ed. Felix Braunsdorf (Berlin: 
Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, November 2016), 33–38. 
2 International Organization for Migration (IOM), Key 
Migration Terms, https://www.iom.int/key-migration-terms# 
Migration (accessed 8 September 2019). 
tigation is enriched with analytical thoughts and 
empirical observations. 
Trade and Migration in Economic Theory 
Wage differentials between countries create an eco-
nomic incentive for labour migration: the greater the 
gap, for example between developing and industrial-
ised countries, the stronger the incentive. Neoclassi-
cal international trade theory, established by David 
Ricardo at the beginning of the nineteenth century, 
assumes that trade between countries reduces wage 
differentials.3 According to Ricardo, trade is based on 
national productivity differences that narrow as the 
respective economies specialise in line with their 
comparative cost advantages. Paul Samuelson and 
Ronald Jones expanded the model in 1971 to take 
account of multiple production factors: strong export-
ing sectors gain through trade, while sectors that are 
competing with imports lose. The Heckscher-Ohlin 
model, developed in the mid-twentieth century by 
Bertil Ohlin and Eli Heckscher, on the other hand, 
treats countries’ different production factor endow-
ments as the sole source of international trade. In 
their understanding trade brings gains to the owners 
of the factors in which the country is rich, while the 
owners of scarce factors lose out. The difference to 
Samuelson and Jones is that the specificity of a factor 
is generally temporary in nature, while the funda-
mental endowment – of labour, land, capital – is 
permanent. 
 
3 On the development of international trade theory, see 
Paul R. Krugman and Maurice Obstfeld, International Econom-
ics: Theory and Policy (Reading, MA, 1997). 
Migration and Trade: 
Theoretical Advances and 
Empirical Observations 
Migration and Trade: Theoretical Advances and Empirical Observations 
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In all the models international trade leads to 
changes in the distribution of production factors, en-
ables growth and causes wage convergence between 
trade partners. These effects occur because growth in 
trade sharpens competition, leading the more com-
petitive enterprises to reduce their production costs 
by operating more efficiently and improving their 
productivity. And this wage convergence reduces the 
incentive to emigrate to a wealthier country in search 
of a better living. There is therefore an element of 
substitution between trade and migration: without 
trade wage differences create an incentive to move 
to countries where they are higher; trade reduces the 
incentive to migrate by encouraging wage conver-
gence, growth and poverty reduction. 
Yet these theoretical observations provide only a 
broad-brush description of the actual effects of trade 
policy. In fact some of the fundamental premises of 
the neo-classical model (the “perfect market”) do not 
really apply in reality and this distorts the findings. 
One case in point is the idea that the adjustment pro-
cesses caused by heightened competition are immedi-
ate and costless (absence of transaction costs). For 
example, a person who becomes unemployed im-
mediately finds a new job. Another assumption is 
perfect market transparency: All economic actors 
are always fully informed about all relevant factors 
(prices, costs, new jobs). In reality, adjustment pro-
cesses are associated with significant social and 
economic costs. 
Between 1980 and the mid-1990s many countries 
unilaterally liberalised their trade under World Bank 
structural adjustment programmes, and by the mid-
1990s it was time to take stock. In the mid-1990s, two 
studies on the relationship between trade and growth 
rates concluded that countries with open economies 
(including poor, resource-dependent countries) dem-
onstrated considerably stronger growth than coun-
tries with closed economies and protectionist eco-
nomic policies.4 Fundamentally both pairs of authors 
sought to prove that it always made political sense 
for a country to integrate into the global market. 
 
4 Jeffrey D. Sachs and Andrew Warner, Economic Reform and 
the Process of Global Integration, Brookings Papers on Economic 
Activity 1/1995 (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1995), https:// 
www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/1995/01/1995a_ 
bpea_sachs_warner_aslund_fischer.pdf (accessed 29 January 
2019), and Jeffrey A. Frankel and David Romer, Trade and 
Growth: An Empirical Investigation, NBER Working Paper 5476 
(Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research 
[NBER], March 1996). 
Firstly, they argued, this allowed them to exploit 
comparative cost advantages and realise economies 
of scale by participating in a larger market. Secondly, 
open economies were less susceptible to lobbying and 
rent-seeking (in the sense of market actors seeking to 
acquire privileges to boost their own income, such 
as tax breaks or protective tariffs).5 Thirdly, they said, 
international trade improved the availability of tech-
nology. In fact, however, these studies only demon-
strated that a country’s external orientation is one 
important factor for sustainable success and economic 
growth. But to conclude that it the sole cause of suc-
cess is just as false as the opposite line of argument, 
the idea that the faults of liberalisation prove that 
protectionism leads to growth. 
In many cases the disjoint between neoclassical 
model and reality was glaring. Trade liberalisation 
is undeniably associated with short-term negative 
effects ranging from unemployment to the collapse 
of entire sectors. Workers are not infinitely flexible, 
and for most it is not an option to shift seamlessly 
from dying industries to new dynamic sectors. Devel-
opments contradicting the assumptions of economic 
theory were in fact observed in Kenya, Tanzania and 
Zimbabwe, where firms responded to import com-
petition by curtailing their output rather than seek-
ing to improve their efficiency.6 Even in rich coun-
tries, integration in global markets certainly cannot 
be said to have led automatically to a reduction in 
poverty. The fear of trade critics is therefore that 
those who find their economic perspectives destroyed 
by trade liberalisation will set off to seek opportuni-
ties in other countries.7 
The New Trade Theory in the 1980s/90s expanded 
the neoclassical theory, drawing attention to increas-
ing economies of scale, imperfect markets, external 
effects and the existence of different technologies in 
 
5 The term “rent-seeking” was coined by Anne Krueger in 
her renowned essay, “The Political Economy of the Rent-
Seeking Society”, American Economic Review 64, no. 3 (1974): 
291–303. 
6 World Bank, Economic Growth in the 1990s: Learning from a 
Decade of Reform (Washington, D.C.: World Bank Group, PREM 
Network, 2005), chapter 5: “Trade Liberalization: Why so 
Much Controversy?” 133–55 (149). 
7 For one such critique, see Francisco J. Marí, “Fischerei-, 
Agrar-, Wirtschaftspolitik: Wie die EU Hunger und Armut in 
Afrika schafft”, in Fluchtursachen “Made in Europe”, ed. Brauns-
dorf (see note 1), 27–32. 
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different countries.8 This also cast new light on the 
relationship between trade and migration. For exam-
ple, if technological differences – rather than dif-
ferences in factor endowment – are seen as the basis 
of trade, trade and migration can have complemen-
tary effects.9 
Trade means contact, which 
facilitates migration. 
New Institutional Economics investigates the role 
of information and transaction costs that are neglect-
ed by the neoclassical theory.10 Institutions with for-
mal rules, informal restrictions and relevant imple-
mentation mechanisms are established to reduce 
the costs of transactions. Institutions are themselves 
associated with costs. According to Douglass C. North, 
the success of an economy stands and falls with how 
it deals with transaction costs.11 This supplies another 
new starting point for examining the relationship 
between trade and migration. 
Empirical Evidence and Econometric 
Models: Does Trade Increase or 
Decrease Migration? 
Trade between countries implies contact between 
people. And being better informed about a country 
makes it easier to decide to move there, especially if 
personal ties already exist. Both these aspects – con-
tact and ties – can be intensified by expanding of 
trade relations. Trade also leads to economic change: 
new sectors appear, others are lost, people feel com-
pelled to follow their sources of employment. If 
people are having to relocate anyway, the inhibition 
 
8 See Krugman and Obstfeld, International Economics: Theory 
and Policy (see note 3). 
9 See, for example, Edo Mahendra, Trade Liberalisation 
and Migration Hump: NAFTA as a Quasi-Natural Experiment, 
IMI Working Paper 98 (Oxford: University of Oxford, Inter-
national Migration Institute [IMI], August 2014). 
10 Horst Feldmann, Eine institutionalistische Revolution? Zur 
dogmenhistorischen Bedeutung der modernen Institutionenökonomik 
(Berlin, 1995). 
11 See Douglass C. North, “Economic Performance through 
Time”, American Economic Review 84, no. 3 (1994): 359–68, 
and idem., Institutionen, institutioneller Wandel und Wirtschafts-
leistung (Tübingen, 1992). 
to moving abroad is already lower.12 It is therefore 
plausible that closer trade relations also encourage 
migration, in the sense of a correlation between the 
two. 
Conversely, a correlation is observed between trade 
protectionism and a reduction in migration, as dem-
onstrated by the comprehensive model put forward 
by Rosmaiza Abdul Ghani and colleagues. Although 
they emphasise that correlation does not prove causa-
tion, they arrive at a conclusion that trade protection-
ism leads to a decrease in migration.13 
It is, however, a great challenge to move beyond 
correlation in empirical investigations of the relation-
ship between migration and trade: adequate migra-
tion data is lacking and isolating trade liberalisation 
from other influencing factors is methodologically 
tricky.14 The few deeper analyses of the effects of 
trade flows on migration therefore say relatively little 
about the underlying causalities. An investigation of 
the interaction between trade and migration in the 
scope of the free trade agreements concluded between 
the European Union and the Mediterranean states 
between 1970 and 2000 concludes that increasing 
exports led to growing migration.15 The author there-
fore rejects the assumption of the neoclassical theory 
(which is also found in politics), that liberalisation 
and expansion of external trade reduces migration. 
But the study says nothing about long-term effects 
that might potentially reverse the effect. The reason 
for the observed relationship is thought to be that 
international trade strengthens the connections be-
tween states and thus facilitates migration. But the 
model used in the study also demonstrates that the 
relationship is weaker if the effects of factors as dis-
 
12 Michael A. Clemens, Does Development Reduce Migration? 
IZA Discussion Paper 8592 (Bonn: Center for Global Develop-
ment, Institute for the Study of Labor [IZA], 2014), 12, http:// 
ftp.iza.org/dp8592.pdf (accessed 15 August 2019). 
13 Rosmaiza Abdul Ghani, Michael P. Cameron, William 
Chochrane and Mathew Roskruge, A Gravity Model Estimation 
of the Bi-Directional Relationship between International Trade and 
Migration, Working Paper in Economics 19/2 (Hamilton, NZ: 
University of Waikato, 2019). 
14 Mahendra, Trade Liberalisation and Migration Hump 
(see note 9), 10f. 
15 Nadia Campaniello, “The Causal Effect of Trade on 
Migration: Evidence from Countries of the Euro-Mediter-
ranean Partnership”, Labour Economics 30 (October 2014): 
223–33, https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/c996/b34013540 
647df5ea6f159807ee7536df691.pdf (accessed 28 January 
2019). 
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parate as distance, GDP of countries of origin and 
destination, population, exchange rate or the exist-
ence of historical colonial ties are controlled. In other 
words: all these factors also influence the outcome. 
The United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD) has also noted the existence 
of a correlation between increasing trade and increas-
ing migration, in a study analysing intra-African food 
imports in the scope of the regional integration com-
munities SADC (Southern African Development Com-
munity), CEN-SAD (Communauté des États Sahálo-
Sahariens) and COMESA (Common Market for Eastern 
and Southern Africa).16 But UNCTAD does not see the 
relationship between trade and migration as causal; 
instead the two develop in parallel on account of 
other factors (for example closer economic relations 
between countries or regional integration decisions 
such as easing movement of persons). 
Trade liberalisation stimulates 
migration in the short term, 
but reduces it in the long term. 
Other studies concluded that trade liberalisation 
encouraged migration in the short term but reduced 
it in the longer term through the emergence of new 
trade flows and growth. This so-called “migration 
hump” was already discussed in 1986 by the Commis-
sion for the Study of International Migration and Co-
operative Economic Development, which investigated 
these questions on behalf of the US government.17 
Later studies confirmed that the migration hump 
was an effect of trade liberalisation. For instance, the 
establishment of the North American Free Trade Area 
was followed by about fifteen years of increasing 
migration from Mexico to the United States – but a 
decrease after that. The length of time before the 
downturn in migration depends on the technological 
“head start” of the industrialised country (for example 
in relation to advantages of mass production), on the 
extent of income differences, and on the adjustment 
costs to the developing country associated with the 
changing circumstances caused by a trade agreement. 
 
16 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD), Economic Development in Africa: Report 2018: Migra-
tion for Structural Transformation (New York and Geneva, 2018). 
17 Philip L. Martin and J. Edward Taylor, “The Anatomy of 
a Migration Hump”, in Development Strategy, Employment and 
Migration: Insights from Models, ed. J. Edward Taylor (Paris: 
OECD, 1996), 43–61. 
One study points out that different ex-ante estimates 
and ex-post calculations on the same topic arrive at 
contradictory findings.18 
In an analysis based on econometric studies, the 
European Commission identifies the existence of a 
diaspora as the most important driver of outward 
migration from Africa (see Figure). “Trade” and “Share 
of urban population” share second place, “Income 
differential” follows. According to this research, 
migration flows are most strongly inhibited when per 
capita GDP and population are both growing.19 But 
this relativises the findings suggesting that inter-
national trade is of great importance for migration 
and instead places the latter in relation to the trend 
of GDP per capita. As already demonstrated in 1997 
by a comprehensive gravity model of trade flows, 
trade changes proportionally to GDP where popula-
tion size is constant and is inhibited where an in-
crease in GDP is attributable to population growth 
alone. The explanation for this is that a country with 
population growth will tend to look inward because 
it can realise economies of scale within its own mar-
kets and is therefore less reliant on trade.20 Absolute 
and per capita GDP are thus important explanatory 
factors for both trade and migration. 
Within Africa, according to UNCTAD, the strong 
demand for labour in growth sectors is in most cases 
the main cause of migration. Rwanda has achieved 
strong economic growth, partly through foreign direct 
investment, and has attracted highly qualified work-
ers from elsewhere in East Africa (labour migration 
being normal within Africa). Ethiopia’s growing for-
mal economy is an important driving force for migra-
tion, with special economic zones contributing to in-
dustrialisation and creating employment in the foot-
wear, textiles and clothing sectors. These new indus-
tries work overwhelmingly for the export economy. 
In the Horn of Africa informal trade also plays an 
important role. 
Migrants from the West African state of Burkina 
Faso migrate to work in agriculture and forestry in 
 
18 Mahendra, Trade Liberalisation and Migration Hump 
(see note 9). 
19 European Commission, Many More to Come? Migration 
from and within Africa (Luxembourg: Joint Research Centre, 
2018), 21, https://ec.europa.eu/jrc/sites/jrcsh/files/africa_ 
policy_report_2018_final.pdf (accessed 27 September 2019). 
Unfortunately the sources upon which the study is based 
are not stated. 
20 Jeffrey A. Frankel, Regional Trading Blocs in the World Eco-
nomic System (Washington, D.C., 1997). 
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Gabon. According to UNCTAD, this type of labour 
migration in export sectors is frequently associated 
with the use of unqualified child labour in agricul-
ture, in domestic service and in the informal sector. 
This also applies to migration originating in Burkina 
Faso, from where children travel above all to Côte 
d’Ivoire to work in the cocoa sector. In the afore-
mentioned cases there is a connection to the topic 
of trade, but not to specific instruments such as free 
trade agreements. Instead migration is incentivised 
by earning opportunities in specific sectors, in these 
cases export sectors.21 
The correlation between trade and migration is 
weaker within Africa than for Africa’s relationships 
with Asia.22 This is another indication that there must 
be other important explanatory factors for migration, 
which could potentially be more important than the 
trade flows. 
Income and Migration 
Both the theories and the empirical evidence suggest 
that change in standard of living is an important fac-
tor in explaining migration flows. But closer exami-
 
21 UNCTAD, Economic Development in Africa (see note 16). 
22 European Commission, Many More to Come? (see note 19), 21. 
nation reveals that the relationship is by no means 
as clear-cut as one might assume. As a rule, very little 
migration occurs where per-capita income is very low: 
people simply cannot afford to relocate. But when 
annual per-capita income rises to $7,000 to $13,000 
more choose to migrate; above that level the propen-
sity declines again.23 This produces the aforemen-
tioned migration hump, whose peak is identified with 
different income levels depending on the source.24 
However, when individual countries are tracked 
over multiple decades the findings on the relation-
ship between per-capita income and migration di-
verge enormously. One reason for this could be 
that the periods investigated – generally fifteen to 
twenty-five years – are too short to reflect the entire 
transition. If one believes that the migration hump 
can also explain developments within an individual 
country, then one must expect very long transitional 
periods before the peak is reached:25 Assuming 3 per-
cent annual growth in per-capita income, a country 
 
23 Ibid. See also Clemens, Does Development Reduce Migration? 
(see note 12). 
24 Clemens identifies the peak at “an income per capita 
of roughly PPP$5,000–6,000 (today’s Jordan or Jamaica)”, 
in Does Development Reduce Migration? (see note 12), 5. 
25 Wilbur Zelinsky (1971) coined the term “mobility tran-
sition” to describe this, quoted in ibid. (see note 12), 10. 
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at the level of development of Niger or Burundi will 
need forty-two years; for countries at the level of 
Cambodia or Zambia the figure would be sixty-three 
years. And it must be remembered that 3 percent is 
a relatively high growth rate for per-capita income. 
In 2017 it was achieved by only thirteen countries 
in Sub-Saharan Africa (Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte 
d’Ivoire, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-
Bissau, Mauritius, Rwanda, Senegal, Seychelles, Tan-
zania); the mean for the region as a whole was –
0.2 percent, because steady population growth means 
that good economic performance is not reflected in 
significant increases in per-capita GDP.26 
According to Michael A. Clemens, the causes for 
rising migration rates before the peak of the hump 
are declining child mortality (which increases popu-
lation pressure), growing financial flexibility (because 
a minimum level of resources are required to be able 
to migrate), structural change and internal labour 
migration, increasing inequality and awareness there-
of, and the expansion of legal immigration opportu-
nities in receiving countries.27 A special role is played 
by migration networks, in other words the existence 
of a diaspora. Most migrants move to regions where 
they already have family and/or friends and prospects 
of employment. This connection between country of 
origin and receiving country can play a role in further 
consolidating migration flows.28 
Thu Hien Dao and colleagues on the other hand 
focus on the positive correlations between per-capita 
GDP and growth in the low-income phase, and find 
that the level of qualifications in the population and 
(otherwise unspecified) macroeconomic explanations 
outweigh microeconomic factors based on existing 
individual contacts to the diaspora. Their explanation 
for the correlation is that growth leads to broader 
tertiary education and thus expands the most mobile 
group.29 
 
26 World Bank, GDP per Capita Growth (Annual %), https:// 
data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.KD.ZG?view=chart 
(accessed 24 June 2019). 
27 Clemens, Does Development Reduce Migration? (see note 12), 9ff. 
28 Martin and Taylor, “The Anatomy of a Migration Hump” 
(see note 17). 
29 Thu Hien Dao, Frédéric Docquier, Chris Parsons and 
Giovanni Peri, “Migration and Development: Dissecting the 
Anatomy of the Mobility Transition”, Journal of Development 
Economics 132 (2018): 88–101. 
Migration deepens trade flows 
between countries. 
The econometric models tell us little of substance 
about causalities between per-capita GDP and migra-
tion. As for the correlation between trade and migra-
tion, few general conclusions can be drawn – aside 
from identifying a correlation between the two fac-
tors. The more detailed the models the more diverse 
the findings. Nor does identification of the migration 
hump as a phenomenon in itself say anything about 
the development of a specific country. 
Does Migration Lead to More or 
Less Trade? 
While it is unclear whether expanding trade encour-
ages or discourages migration, it is uncontested that 
migration deepens trade relations between the coun-
tries involved.30 Empirical studies show that migra-
tion stimulates exports from the receiving country 
more strongly where the migrants are highly quali-
fied and where the countries of origin and destina-
tion are linguistically and/or culturally very different. 
Migrants from countries where a very rare language 
is spoken or where corruption, legal insecurity and 
weak institutions predominate can make an impor-
tant contribution in the receiving country, by im-
proving the understanding of how their country of 
origin functions and consolidating the connection to 
their complicated home markets. In economic terms 
this makes it easier to overcome informal trade bar-
riers and thus lowers trade costs.31 Migrants are, for 
instance, capable of accessing and supplying infor-
mation about customers and procurement opportuni-
ties. Trade and productivity in the receiving country 
may thus profit from their cultural and technological 
 
30 In a major study analysing the period 1970 to 2000, 
Rodolfo Metulini and colleagues find significant indirect 
effects of migration on trade flows. See Rodolfo Metulini, 
Paolo Sgrignoli, Stefano Schiavo and Massimo Riccaboni, 
“The Network of Migrants and International Trade”, Economia 
Politica 35, no. 3 (2018): 763–87, https://link.springer.com/ 
article/10.1007/s40888-018-0106-6 (accessed 25 September 
2019). 
31 See Barry R. Chiswick and Paul W. Miller, eds., Handbook 
of the Economics of International Migration, vol. 1B: The Impact and 
Regional Studies (Oxford and Amsterdam, 2015), http://www. 
sciencedirect.com/science/handbooks/22120092/1 (accessed 
11 February 2019). 
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abilities. A quantification of this phenomenon for the 
OECD states found that a 1 percent increase in migra-
tion was equivalent to lowering import tariffs by 3.7 
percent, in the case of highly qualified labour migrants 
and strongly differentiated products the figure can 
be as high as 21.7 percent.32 UNCTAD investigated the 
same phenomenon for migration within Africa and 
also came to a positive finding.33 But this export-
boosting effect in the receiving country only occurs 
if the immigrants are integrated in its economy and 
labour market. The effect is, as intimated, greater the 
better qualified the migrant workers are. And espe-
cially highly qualified workers are especially mobile. 
This equation leaves the countries of origin bearing 
the burden of brain drain. As well as losing their in-
vestment in training the emigrants, they may also 
forfeit tax revenues and face a general deterioration 
of perspectives. Sub-Saharan Africa, as the region 
containing most of the world’s poorest countries, is 
especially severely affected. More than 20 percent of 
those who have received a tertiary education there 
today live in OECD countries.34 The problem is exacer-
bated by the fact that higher-qualified workers are 
generally better able to bear the costs of migration 
and more likely to be admitted by the OECD coun-
tries. Especially many have migrated to industrialised 
countries experiencing labour shortages, notably in 
the information technology and communications sec-
tors.35 The WTO did, however, point out at the end of 
the 1990s that certain countries trained more workers 
than their labour markets were able to absorb,36 
which in these cases relativised the brain drain issue. 
 
32 Gabriel J. Felbermayr and Farid Toubal, “Revisiting 
the Trade-Migration Nexus: Evidence from New OECD Data”, 
World Development 40, no. 5 (2012): 928–37 (935). 
33 UNCTAD, Migration for Structural Transformation 
(see note 16), 102. 
34 Marion Panizzon, Trade and Labor Migration: GATS Mode 4 
and Migration Agreements, Dialogue on Globalization, Occa-
sional Papers 47 (Geneva: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, January 
2010). 
35 IOM, World Bank and World Trade Organization (WTO), 
Background Paper, Trade and Migration Seminar (Geneva,  
4–5 October 2004, https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/ 
serv_e/sem_oct04_e/background_paper_e.pdf (accessed 9 July 
2018). 
36 WTO, Council for Trade in Services, Presence of Natural 
Persons (Mode 4), Background Note by the Secretariat, S/C/W/75 
(8 December 1998), http://bit.ly/31DZSu8 (accessed 16 August 
2019). 
Immigration also tends to stimulate imports in the 
receiving countries, because many immigrants retain 
their consumer preferences and are able to arrange 
corresponding imports through their contacts in their 
country of origin. For instance UNCTAD found that 
the growing diasporas created by intra-African migra-
tion have led above all to a rise in food imports from 
the countries of origin.37 For countries of origin in 
turn, the diaspora frequently becomes an important 
source of capital (via remittances and investments) as 
well as know-how and technology.38 The volume of 
remittances has increased significantly since 2000. In 
2010 they represented 42 percent of private capital 
inflows to Africa; by 2016 this had increased to 51 
percent.39 These inflows – which exceed total private 
investment – can in turn invigorate trade flows. 
It is empirically clear that migration has a stimu-
lating effect on imports and exports. And, as Ghani 
and colleagues demonstrate, restricting migration 
has inhibiting effects on international trade.40 
 
37 UNCTAD, Migration for Structural Transformation 
(see note 16), 98. 
38 Mina Mashayekhi, Contribution of Migrants to Development: 
Trade, Investment and Development Linkages (Geneva: UNCTAD, 
29 July 2009), http://unctad.org/en/docs/emditctncd_01_en. 
pdf (accessed 18 June 2018). 
39 UNCTAD, Migration for Structural Transformation 
(see note 16), 135. 
40 Ghani et al., A Gravity Model Estimation (see note 13). 
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Given that neoclassical international trade theory 
automatically assumes that expanding trade reduces 
migration, a specific examination of the role of migra-
tion in relation to trade policy instruments would 
appear superfluous. Indeed, the term “migration” is 
absent from the WTO rules and one searches in vain 
in WTO texts for references to the work of other in-
stitutions dealing with migration, such as the Inter-
national Organisation for Migration (IOM). Yet in fact 
the issue of labour migration has been a topic in 
trade negotiations for more than two decades – but 
under a different label. 
GATS – Market Opening for Supply of 
Services by Natural Persons 
The General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) 
came into effect in 1995, as one outcome of the very 
comprehensive last round of negotiations on liberal-
ising world trade (the Uruguay Round). GATS is ex-
plicitly not about labour migration. Its object is move-
ment of people across borders to supply services. In 
practice, however, this also creates legal possibilities 
for labour migration. The Agreement defines four 
Modes of cross-border trade in services: 
 Mode 1: Cross-border trade (example: insurance 
services offered abroad) 
 Mode 2: Consumption abroad (example: tourism) 
 Mode 3: Commercial presence (service supplier 
establishes a branch or subsidiary abroad; example: 
car rental abroad) 
 Mode 4: Presence of natural persons (example: care 
workers). 
An Annex specifies that Mode 4 applies to “meas-
ures affecting natural persons who are service sup-
pliers of a Member, and natural persons of a Member 
who are employed by a service supplier of a Member, 
in respect of the supply of a service”. 
The mainstream interpretation within the WTO is 
that GATS does not serve to open the possibility of 
labour migration to persons employed in the import-
ing country (although certain countries do precisely 
that, including the United States with the so-called 
H-1B visa).41 The Annex explicitly states that: “The 
Agreement shall not apply to measures affecting 
natural persons seeking access to the employment 
market of a Member.”42 It also clarifies that: “The 
Agreement shall not prevent a Member from applying 
measures to regulate the entry of natural persons 
into, or their temporary stay in, its territory.” 
It is, however, almost impossible to make a sharp 
distinction between “migration” and “Mode 4”, as 
underlined by a statement published jointly by the 
IOM, the World Bank and the WTO: “GATS Mode 4 
is not a migration agreement, and it was not created 
with direct regard to the policies, practices and ad-
ministrative mechanisms utilized by states in manag-
ing temporary labour migration. Nonetheless, that is 
the context within which implementation of existing 
Mode 4 commitments, and consideration of potential 
new Mode 4 commitments, takes place.”43 The Euro-
pean Commission notes that “[T]rade agreements, and 
in particular those negotiated by the EU, aim to steer 
clear of migration policies, by adopting a different 
vocabulary (professionals vs. workers, mobility vs. 
migration) and by underlining the temporary nature 
and specific purpose of stays.” Yet, as the document 
goes on to point out: “[I]t is also clear that the liberali-
sation agreed in those trade agreements cannot have 
 
41 Johanna Jacobsson, “Liberalisation of Service Mobility 
in the EU’s International Trade Agreements: As External as It 
Gets”, European Journal of Migration and Law 15, no. 3 (2013): 
245–61 (247). 
42 WTO, Annex on Movement of Natural Persons Supplying 
Services under the Agreement, https://www.wto.org/english/ 
tratop_e/serv_e/8-anmvnt_e.htm (accessed 4 February 2019). 
43 IOM, World Bank and WTO, Background Paper 
(see note 35), 2. 
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any effect as regards entry and temporary stay of 
natural persons for business purposes if no adequate 
admission policies are put in place in the host coun-
tries.”44 In other words, efforts to draw a clear distinc-
tion between trade liberalisation under Mode 4 and 
arrangements for migration must be understood 
primarily as a political declaration of intent. It has 
little basis in reality. 
Negotiating Interests in Mode 4 
Countries of origin and destination each have their 
own economic interests in connection with trade in 
services supplied by natural persons (Mode 4). States 
call on other states to open their markets to service 
exports, and make offers – in effect “concessions” – 
on opening their own markets to precisely defined 
services. The term “concessions” springs from the 
same logic as that followed by the GATS negotiations. 
Above and beyond the narrow economic interest in 
trade in services, there is another important reason 
for including labour migration in the scope of trade 
talks: Expanding the scope covered by the negotia-
tions makes it easier to achieve an outcome because 
interests can be balanced across a larger set of issues. 
If one side – let’s say the EU – agrees to a trade 
partner’s demand to grant market access to service 
suppliers, it improves its own chances of receiving 
concessions in other areas such as market access for 
goods or intellectual property protections. For exam-
ple in the WTO’s abortive Doha Round the question 
of Mode 4 was a major issue for India, which wanted 
the United States to grant 250,000 additional visas.45 
Receiving countries in particular are concerned 
to avoid losing control over their own immigration 
policy in the course of liberalisation of trade in ser-
vices. Opening markets to foreign service suppliers 
certainly does not mean the same as conceding un-
restricted migration. A range of labour market and 
 
44 European Commission, Fitness Check on EU Legislation 
on Legal Migration, Commission Staff Working Document, 
SWD(2019)1056 final (Brussels, 29 March 2019), 151, https:// 
ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/e-library/ 
documents/policies/legal-migration/swd_2019-1055-staff-
working-part2.pdf (accessed 24 September 2019). 
45 Alexander Betts and Kalypso Nicolaidis, The Trade-Migra-
tion Linkage: GATS Mode IV (Oxford: University of Oxford, 
19 February 2009), http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/ 
download?doi=10.1.1.508.3249&rep=rep1&type=pdf (ac-
cessed 9 July 2018). 
migration policy instruments is available to ensure 
this. In the negotiations states have the right to pre-
cisely define the professions, periods and conditions 
for which they open their markets. One example from 
the EU’s Economic Partnership Agreement with Carib-
bean states is limited access for fashion models, chefs 
and music groups.46 States are free to stipulate how 
many service providers may enter within a specified 
period and for how long they may stay; this may be 
limited to a few months. Importing states generally 
employ additional instruments such as needs assess-
ments to protect their own service sectors.47 This allows 
them to counter the widespread fears that conces-
sions on Mode 4 would lead to the displacement of 
local workers. While this may be politically expedi-
ent, in practice such provisions frequently undermine 
the agreed concessions. Very rarely are the criteria 
underlying the needs assessments defined, creating 
great leeway for inconsistency in their application. 
Requiring licences and formal qualifications also has 
inhibiting effects. This applies in particular to the 
condition (which is included in most schedules) that 
persons entering under Mode 4 possess a valid em-
ployment contract in their country of origin. This 
naturally subverts the incentive to migrate in the first 
place. 
Investment (largely from indus-
trialised countries) accounts for 60 
percent of trade in services; natural 
persons account for 5 percent. 
Despite all these restrictions, market opening 
under Mode 4 is a matter of great political sensitivity. 
The WTO has concluded that most member states 
have avoided comprehensive commitments to open-
ing for natural persons under GATS: Not all states 
have offered commitments under Mode 4, most have 
added numerous exceptions, and market access 
bound in the WTO therefore often lags behind the 
actual market access situation. 
 
46 “Economic Partnership Agreement between the 
CARIFORUM States, of the one part, and the European Com-
munity and its Member States, of the other part”, Official 
Journal of the European Union, L 289/I/3 (30 October 2008), 
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri= 
OJ:L:2008:289:0003:1955:EN:PDF (accessed 20 June 2019). 
47 On the following, see WTO, Presence of Natural Persons 
(see note 36), Para. 40. 
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The Actual Role of Mode 4 in World Trade 
Although poorer countries in particular have a great 
interest in exporting services supplied by natural 
persons, Mode 4 plays only a marginal role in global 
trade in services with a share of less than 5 percent. 
Mode 3, commercial presence in the context of for-
eign direct investment, accounts for 55 to 60 per-
cent.48 These trade statistics reflect the power imbal-
ance between industrialised countries and developing 
countries. Services traded are usually those that are 
exported principally by industrialised countries 
that possess a highly qualified workforce and capital 
seeking investment opportunities. Additionally, the 
option of temporary migration under Mode 4 is fre-
quently only granted in connection with the trade 
partner opening their economy to outside invest-
ment; many of the concessions apply to movement of 
staff within corporations. Obviously, poorer countries 
without significant investments abroad cannot make 
use of these possibilities.49 In addition, the vagueness 
of the terms used in relation to Mode 4 (business visi-
tors, senior executives) offers greater leeway for diverging 
national interpretations than is the case with other 
modes. 
Market opening for natural persons in the scope 
of trade agreements requires national agencies in the 
participating countries to modify their visa regula-
 
48 Panizzon, Trade and Labor Migration (see note 34). 
49 WTO, Presence of Natural Persons (see note 36). 
tions accordingly. This creates great problems in prac-
tice, because visa regulations are often not brought 
into line with new free trade agreements. This further 
devalues the small number of market access offers 
granted to date for natural persons. India proposed a 
solution for this problem in the WTO: a special GATS 
visa, which would be given administrative priority 
ahead of other visa applications.50 Although this does 
not yet exist at WTO level, some bilateral trade agree-
ments with the United States do provide for such visas. 
Certain bilateral migration agreements ease access 
through occupational shortage lists, which obviate 
the need for case-by-case labour market tests.51 The 
EU is currently working to more closely connect trade 
and migration policy.52 
Even unilateral preferences for the Least Developed 
Countries (LDCs), on the basis the so-called LDC waiver 
introduced by the WTO in 2011,53 have failed to sig-
nificantly stimulate Mode 4 imports from these coun-
tries. A waiver is necessary because the WTO rules 
 
50 WTO, Council for Trade in Services, Communication from 
India: Proposed Liberalisation of Movement of Professionals under 
GATS, S/CSS/W/12 (Geneva, 24 November 2000), http://bit.ly/ 
2P975Rw (accessed 4 February 2019). The document provides 
a very good overview of the restrictions to Mode 4 conces-
sions. 
51 See Panizzon, Trade and Labor Migration (see note 34), 34. 
52 Ibid.; see also the next section, pp. 17f. 
53 WTO, Preferential Treatment to Services and Service Suppliers 
of Least-Developed Countries, WT/L/847 (Geneva, 19 December 
2011). 
Motives for export and import of services under Mode 4 
Migration countries of origin  Migration receiving countries 
∎ Labour surplus in home market; 
∎ Interest in addressing knowledge deficits through 
temporary migration of natural persons; 
∎ Remittances from abroad; 
∎ Protect own citizens working abroad. 
 ∎ Provision of services subject to shortages in the 
home market (for example carers in ageing 
societies); 
∎ Interest of multinational enterprises in relocating 
staff internationally, also to form project teams; 
∎ Interest of investors in uncomplicated business 
travel; 
∎ Access to first-class services for the home 
economy. 
Source: Author, using data from IOM, World Bank and World Trade  
Organization (WTO), Background Paper, Trade and Migration Seminar  
(Geneva, 4–5 October 2004), https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/serv_e/ 
sem_oct04_e/background_paper_e.pdf (accessed 9 July 2018). 
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require all countries to be treated equally. The privi-
leges permitted by the waiver are not negotiated 
between trading nations but granted unilaterally, in 
this case twenty-five industrialised countries includ-
ing the EU grant the LDCs time-limited preferences 
until 2030. However they apply largely to Mode 2, 
where consumers make use of services abroad. This 
is an area where there are already few restrictions, so 
the preference schemes do little more than codify a 
pre-existing level of liberalisation.54 According to the 
United Nations Committee for Development Policy 
these arrangements have almost no effect on service 
exports from this group of countries – least of all 
in relation to supply of services by natural persons. 
Moreover, because the preferences are granted uni-
laterally they can also be taken away again. This 
uncertainty means they are of less value than the 
results of trade talks, which are unrestricted. 
Linking Migration and Trade Agreements 
In the greater scheme, labour migration – in the 
sense of provision of services by natural persons – 
occupies a marginal place in world trade. This is a 
function of the domestic political fears that the issue 
provokes almost everywhere. However the negotiat-
ing structure of GATS itself may also contribute to the 
slowness of progress on concessions on Mode 4. The 
approach of scrupulously avoiding any impression 
that this is about labour migration means that the 
societal risks associated with cross-border movement 
of persons are neither addressed nor curtailed. There 
are also technical deficits: the categories of service 
suppliers are not clearly defined and the structure of 
the schedules is complicated. 
Trade talks and terms also need to be better coor-
dinated with the needs and requirements of national 
immigration policy. Categorisation under “trade in 
services” generally creates incoherence with national 
immigration rules.55 Visa regulations, exemptions 
and other questions of movement of persons still 
remain explicitly outside the scope of GATS. Action 
on multiple fronts would be required to bring this 
 
54 United Nations Committee for Development Policy, 
What Benefit? Preferential Treatment to Services and Services Sup-
pliers of LDCs, https://www.un.org/ldcportal/what-benefit-
preferential-treatment-to-services-and-services-suppliers-of-
ldcs/ (accessed 23 November 2018). 
55 See Panizzon, Trade and Labor Migration (see note 34), 9. 
sphere into line with national immigration frame-
works. The countries of origin would like to see the 
structure of Mode 4 schedules modified to address 
their concerns about brain drain; the receiving coun-
tries want to ensure that foreign migrants do not 
overstay their work permits. The researcher Marion 
Panizzon sees a shared commitment to “ensure the 
timely and voluntary return of workers” as a precon-
dition for achieving more concessions on Mode 4 
within GATS.56 That would mean including elements 
normally found in migration agreements. 
Better coordinate trade and 
migration instruments. 
The idea of expanding the scope touches on the 
current fundamental understanding of free trade 
negotiations, which treats Mode 4 purely as a ques-
tion of trade. Yet WTO rules and trade agreements do 
in fact have a bearing on internal regulatory matters, 
for example in relation to trade facilitation, intellec-
tual property protections and non-tariff barriers. So 
the proposed changes would not be completely alien 
to the system. In view of the labour shortages in 
numerous industrialised countries it might be worth 
considering combining aspects of trade and migration 
agreements in order to better address the justified 
concerns of the receiving countries. 
Bilateral migration agreements are still regarded 
as the primary instrument of labour market manage-
ment. The International Labour Organisation put the 
total number of bilateral labour agreements in 2015 
at 358.57 These agreements permit temporary migra-
tion to be controlled within a narrowly defined 
framework. Since around year 2000 certain countries 
have expanded the possibilities for temporary migra-
tion and sought to improve its effectiveness through 
a multitude of individual laws and instruments. 
According to the political scientist and migration 
researcher Steffen Angenendt, agreements concluded 
since the global economic crisis of 2008/09 prioritise 
the goal of restricting irregular migration and ensur-
ing that rejected migrants are repatriated.58 Demo-
 
56 Ibid., 15, 24. 
57 Aurelia Segatti, “Bilateral Labour Migration Agreements: 
Trends and Examples of Good Practice”, presentation at ILO 
Labour Migration Information-sharing Session, Kadoma Hotel, Zim-
babwe, 16–17 July 2015. 
58 See Steffen Angenendt, Entwicklungspolitische Perspektiven 
temporärer und zirkulärer Migration, SWP-Studie 13/2014 
(Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, August 2014). 
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graphic ageing and the growing shortages of skilled 
labour affecting most industrialised countries will 
also play a role in future. 
The ILO’s Model Agreement on Temporary and Per-
manent Migration for Employment of 1949 has in the 
meantime been revised and expanded.59 It contains 
comprehensive texts covering all aspects of dealing 
with labour migration, from working conditions and 
social insurance to double taxation and return. But 
the main thrust of the Model Agreement is defining 
the framework for labour migration, rather than 
describing possible jobs. There is therefore little over-
lap between it and the GATS rules for Mode 4, even 
though they would actually complement each other 
very well: although trade concessions in the sphere 
of services and movement of persons precisely define 
the possible areas of employment for labour migrants, 
they exclude the aspects that the Model Agreement 
proposes to regulate. 
Finding the correct balance between regulation 
and liberalisation is a great challenge. A comprehen-
sive study by the ILO reviewed more than 151 bilat-
eral agreements and memoranda of understanding 
on migration of low skilled workers and laid out 
recommendations. Some of these relate to mecha-
nisms that are already common in free trade agree-
ments, and in some cases have already been tested in 
practice. For instance “a system for regular monitor-
ing and periodic evaluation” is proposed, principally 
through joint committees.60 EU trade agreements 
already contain such instruments, which could be 
supplemented with migration aspects in connection 
with Mode 4. The ILO also advises “[u]sing multilat-
eral and regional forums and regional integration 
areas to arrive at consensus on mutually beneficial 
improvements to agreements and minimum stand-
ards”. This would also suggest using regional trade 
negotiations on services for the issue of migration/ 
 
59 ILO, Model Agreement on Temporary and Permanent Migration 
for Employment, including Migration of Refugees and Displaced Per-
sons, Annex to R 086 Migration for Employment Recommen-
dation, (Revised) 1949 (no. 86) (Geneva, 1949), https:/www. 
ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:12100:0::NO:: 
P12100_INSTRUMENT_ID:312424 (accessed 28 January 2019). 
60 ILO and Global Knowledge Partnership on Migration 
and Development (KNOMAD), Bilateral Agreements and Memo-
randa of Understanding on Migration of Low-Skilled Workers: A 
Review (Geneva, 2015), https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/ 
public/---ed_protect/---protrav/---migrant/documents/ 
genericdocument/wcms_357389.pdf (accessed 4 February 
2019). 
Mode 4, for example in connection with economic 
partnership agreements with the European Union. 
Other proposals made in the ILO study resemble those 
that have already been put forward in connection 
with free trade agreements. Thus it would be impor-
tant to support implementation of trade agreements 
by initiating reforms in other areas. For the area of 
migration that would mean for example minimum 
wages, social insurance regimes and reintegration 
measures. 
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Findings of the Analytical Section 
Beyond the observed correlations, an unambiguous 
relation between trade liberalisation and migration 
cannot be demonstrated empirically. Investigations 
to date arrive at strongly diverging findings depending 
on which additional factors are included: trade can 
sometimes contribute to increasing migration, some-
times decreasing it, or other factors may affect both. 
It turns out that a series of factors associated with 
trade flows are also important explanatory factors for 
migration flows. Per-capita GDP is especially impor-
tant. But this also raises the fundamental question 
of the extent to which international trade can con-
tribute to sustainable economic development. 
Combining the discussion around New Trade Theory 
and New Institutional Economics with empirical ob-
servations produces differentiated policy recommen-
dations for leveraging trade policy to promote growth 
and development as the necessary long-term basis 
for disincentivising migration. The prevailing opinion 
until the early 1990s – that the free market with 
minimum state intervention was the ideal basis for 
economic development – has in the meantime been 
rejected. More recent research suggests that much 
more complex policy approaches are required to do 
justice to the diversity of situations of LDCs: 
∎ The globalisation process produces winners and 
losers. Which countries these are depends on 
multiple factors: historical happenstance, concrete 
economic structure, level of development, geo-
graphical proximity to flourishing economic cen-
tres.61 Successful trade policy must therefore take 
 
61 For a summary of the New Trade Theory see Evita 
Schmieg, Regionale Integration: die Europäische Union und die 
Karibik, Dissertation (Leipzig, 2006). 
each country’s specific situation into account: 
trade does not automatically lead to convergence. 
The new models therefore stress “the necessity 
of autonomous development in the periphery”.62 
∎ Trade reforms must be embedded in broader 
reform strategies. Although all countries with sus-
tained growth have lowered trade barriers, but 
trade reforms could only prove successful where 
other restrictions were also addressed at the same 
time through prudent economic policy, expansion 
of trade-related infrastructure and institutions, 
and investment in human capital.63 Efficiency can 
be enhanced by reducing internal and external 
trade costs, including those for infrastructure, as 
well as market opening for intermediate goods. 
∎ Almost all successful countries have implicitly or 
explicitly promoted their exports. But that worked 
only where the administration is efficient and well-
functioning. Especially in poorer countries this fun-
damental precondition is not fulfilled.64 
∎ A country will only be able to profit from free 
flows of trade and capital if it possesses a mini-
mum of institutional capacity and human capital. 
Otherwise trade liberalisation will lead to instabil-
ity. Institutional capacities are tied to precondi-
tions: innovation, education and training are 
among the most important for success under glob- 
 
62 Original: “Notwendigkeit eigenständiger Entwicklungen 
in der Peripherie”; Robert Kappel, “Paul R. Krugman (1953–) 
– Die neue Außenhandelstheorie und die Ungleichheit der 
Nationen”, Entwicklung und Zusammenarbeit 40, no. 1 (1999): 
179–82. 
63 See World Bank, Economic Growth in the 1990s (see note 6), 
133–55. 
64 Ibid. 
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Overview 1 
Relationships between trade and migration according to theoretical, econometric and 
analytical research 
Type of trade/migration relationship Explanatory factor 
Substitution  
(more trade – less migration) 
Trade leads to wage convergence and increase in GDP, 
which lowers incentive to migrate. 
Unclear:  
Complementarity or substitution 
Other motivations than wage differences lead to trade 
and factor price equalisation (New Trade Theory: 
economies of scale, technological differences, external 
effects), trade can stimulate or reduce migration. 
Complementarity 
(more trade – more migration) 
∎ Trade liberalisation increases per-capita GDP, in turn 
relaxing financial constraints on migration; 
∎ Trade liberalisation leads to adjustment costs (wage 
reductions or unemployment), which motivate in 
particular highly qualified individuals to migrate; 
∎ Trade liberalisation and adjustment costs principally 
affect labour-intensive sectors; therefore above all 
low-qualified workers migrate; 
∎ Trade strengthens ties between states and facilitates 
migration if trade agreements for example ease 
personal mobility; 
∎ Positive correlation between trade and migration, 
other factors identified as causes of migration, for 
example strong demand for labour. 
Complementarity 
(more migration – more trade) 
∎ Existence of a diaspora leads to 
– increasing exports from the receiving country 
because of improved information about the 
country of origin (emigration networks); 
– increasing imports to the receiving country, 
driven by new consumer preferences; 
– more migration because of better information 
about the receiving country in the country of 
origin and interest in family reunification; 
∎ Correlation because of other factors: growth sectors 
(investment creates demand for labour which causes 
both migration and expansion of trade flows). 
First more migration, then less Trade liberalisation initially causes adjustment costs 
that drive migration. In the long term GDP increases, 
migration decreases (migration hump). 
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 alisation.65 The preconditions for improving pro-
ductivity and leveraging national comparative 
advantages include infrastructure and public 
services.66 
∎ Contradicting the predominant assumption of the 
1980s, trade liberalisation can exacerbate inequali-
ty and poverty. Market integration should there-
fore be backed by social and distribution policies 
addressing those problems.67 
The role of trade policy should not 
be overestimated as many factors 
affect migration. 
Many influences and underlying circumstances 
play a role in deciding whether trade policy helps in 
the long term to reduce the incentive to migrate as 
per-capita income rises. Weakening import protec-
tions, and even granting easier access to markets, do 
not automatically lead to rising standards of living. 
The development and migration policy expectations 
placed on trade agreements should therefore be kept 
moderate. The defining factors for a country’s devel-
opment are above all its internal conditions and stra-
tegic support for trade reforms through reforms 
in other policy areas, through rule of law and good 
governance. The outcomes of trade agreements thus 
depend crucially on their implementation. In devel-
oping countries this is hampered by inadequate fi-
nancial, administrative and entrepreneurial capac-
ities. 
Against this background, a trade policy that seeks 
to take into account the connection between trade 
and migration must make a long-term contribution 
to sustainable growth perspectives. That requires the 
scope and shape of trade policy instruments to satisfy 
 
65 Jean-Yves Huwart and Loïc Verdier, Economic Globali-
sation: Origins and Consequences, OECD Insights (Paris: OECD 
Publishing, 2013), https://read.oecd-ilibrary.org/economics/ 
economic-globalisation_9789264111905-en#page3 (accessed 
19 June 2019). 
66 Martin and Taylor, “The Anatomy of a Migration Hump” 
(see note 17). 
67 Neil McCulloch, L. Alan Winters and Xavier Cirera, Trade 
Liberalization and Poverty – A Handbook (London: Centre for 
Economic Policy Research [CEPR], 2001), https://vi.unctad.org/ 
tapcd/papers_documents/mcculloch_winters_cirera_2001_ 
trade_liberalization_poverty.pdf (accessed 18 September 2019). 
certain conditions.68 The following elements play a 
role: 
∎ In order to avoid negative effects such as unem-
ployment, sustainability impact assessments must 
be used to identify the chances and risks for the 
trading partners before trade agreements are con-
cluded. 
∎ Positive effects of agreements should occur as 
rapidly as possible. Agreements therefore need to 
include real market opening for significant export 
products. 
∎ This demands prudent sequencing of the liberalisa-
tion steps foreseen in the agreement: short-term 
negative effects attributable to the process of ad-
justment to heightened competition must be avoided 
where possible through longer transitional periods 
for lowering import tariffs in endangered sectors. 
Sectors classified as important for internal develop-
ment need to be protected. 
∎ On the other hand, tariffs on important production 
inputs – which may also include services – should 
be lowered immediately. 
∎ Agreements must be flexible enough to satisfy 
requirements such as food security and domestic 
industrial development (protection of infant indus-
tries). 
∎ In the case of problematic developments following 
trade liberalisation it is important to be able to re-
spond with flexible safeguard mechanisms. 
∎ Countries must actually be able to make use of 
the new market access granted by agreements. But 
especially in developing countries the capacities 
and financial prerequisites are frequently lacking. 
Support for poorer countries through aid for trade 
is therefore of central importance for successful 
implementation. 
∎ Aspects of social and ecological sustainability must 
also be addressed in order to prevent negative ef-
fects that cause displacement (such as environmen-
tal harm associated with manufacturing). 
Checklist Trade and Migration 
The following checklist on the relationship between 
trade and migration serves to summarise and assess 
 
68 See Evita Schmieg, Trade and Investment Agreements for 
Sustainable Development? Lessons from the EU’s Economic Partner-
ship Agreement with the Caribbean, SWP Research Paper 6/2015 
(Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, July 2015). 
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the most important possible impacts (also of individ-
ual trade instruments). But it can only approximate 
the complex connections between trade instruments 
and migration flows, and makes no claim to com-
pleteness. Nevertheless, it does identify the factors 
and indicators that are known and must be taken 
into account in impact analyses. 
Effectiveness of the trade instrument 
∎ Are the participating actors/importers in Europe 
and the producers in the partner country properly 
informed about the terms of the agreement? 
∎ Do the producers possess the capacities required 
to increase production? 
∎ Do the internal circumstances – including infra-
structure – permit production to be increased? 
Or do other factors such as access to credit and 
other production inputs stand in the way of ex-
panding production? 
∎ Does the government pursue export promotion? 
∎ Are other forms of trade-related support available 
to resolve the aforementioned problems? 
Framework condition: trade agreement 
oriented on sustainable development 
∎ Has real market access been granted on a scale 
large enough that it cannot be negated by other 
market factors (general market development, 
volumes and prices)? 
∎ Have limits to negative effects of trade liberali-
sation on people and sectors been set through 
broader reform strategies (social security, educa-
tion/training policy, labour market policy)? Are 
long term positive effects on social and ecological 
standards expected? 
Framework condition: internal distribution 
issues 
∎ Do growing exports actually lead to a reduction in 
poverty (through wage rises or growing profits for 
small producers)? Is there freedom of association or 
are other forms of worker participation available? 
∎ Is the overall distribution of the effects of the 
agreement socially equitable? Which groups in 
society profit? 
∎ Distribution issues (local/regional): How does the 
situation vary in different regions? Are structurally 
weak regions especially affected (positively and/or 
negatively)? 
∎ Can short- and long-term effects be differentiated, 
and if so, to what extent? 
How does the agreement affect those willing 
and able to migrate? 
∎ What attitudes to migration are found among the 
social groups that gain or lose through the agree-
ments? 
∎ Are there other factors affecting migration? What 
is the security situation for life and property, in 
terms of the internal political, social and ecological 
circumstances? 
∎ Is there a diaspora? Are there links to the local 
population? 
∎ Does the agreement create possibilities for legal 
migration? 
General framework conditions 
∎ What national political, social and ecological fac-
tors affect the country’s development (natural 
disasters, changing agricultural conditions, new 
taxes etc.)? 
∎ What international factors might influence eco-
nomic and social development more strongly than 
the trade agreement (for example economic and 
social crisis)? 
Overview 2 illustrates how the checklist can be ap-
plied, using the example of a putative increase in 
Tunisia’s olive oil quota in a trade agreement with 
the European Union. 
Perspectives for the Topic of Migration in 
EU Trade Policy 
There are several options for including the topic of 
migration in trade policy. First it can be introduced 
directly into free trade agreements by creating pos-
sibilities for legal migration, as described above. Free 
trade agreements usually contain a dispute settlement 
system. In order to strengthen the incentive to com-
ply with the provision of an agreement, migration 
issues may even be linked with the possibility of trade 
sanctions. Trade agreements can also formulate con-
ditionalities with regard to migration issues or pre-
conditions that have to be fulfilled before ratification. 
Another possibility consists in partner countries iden-
tifying forms of cooperation.  
In future the EU will integrate migration aspects 
more closely into its trade policy. That is what the 
European Commission sets out in its Trade for All 
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strategy, where it names concrete areas for action:69 
Mobility provisions are to supplement trade negotia-
tions for example, and the conditions for intra-corpo-
rate transfers are to be relaxed reciprocally in the 
 
69 European Commission, Trade for All: Towards a More 
Responsible Trade and Investment Policy (Luxembourg, 2014), 12, 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/october/tradoc_ 
153846.pdf (accessed 26 June 2019). 
scope of market access talks. The strategy also calls 
for better coordination of immigration and visa con-
ditions with trade policy and easier recognition of 
professional qualifications. Support for exchange and 
training should “facilitate the effective use of mobil-
ity provisions in FTAs”. 
Easier access to the European market for natural 
persons supplying services (Mode 4), will play a larger 
role in future free trade agreements. Services are an 
Overview 2 
Example of application of the checklist for the theoretical case of “increased olive oil 
quota for Tunisia” 
1. Effectiveness of the trade instrument: 
increase in olive oil quota 
∎ Are importers and exporters aware of the quota 
increase? 
∎ Is the administration capable of dealing with the 
quota, and are import licences also granted to 
small exporters on a non-discriminatory basis? 
∎ Does Tunisia possess the capacities required to 
expand production of olives/olive oil? Are pro-
ducers interested in doing so? 
∎ Do the internal circumstances (credit from finan-
cial sector, availability of production inputs in-
cluding infrastructure) permit production to be 
increased? 
∎ Is aid for trade planned, in order to provide sup-
port (in particular for small and medium-sized 
enterprises) if problems occur? 
2. Framework condition: trade agreement 
orientated on sustainable development 
∎ Is the quota increase large enough to create an 
additional incentive for production and export 
compared to other market factors (general market 
development, volumes and prices)? 
∎ Are possible negative effects of trade liberalisa-
tion contained? 
3. Internal framework condition 
distribution issues 
∎ Which groups profit from the increase in the 
olive oil quota? Will the poor rural population 
also receive a share of the resulting returns? Will 
wage labourers and small-scale producers receive 
a share? Is there freedom of association or are 
other forms of worker participation available? 
 ∎ How does the agreement affect the situation in 
different regions? Are structurally weak regions 
especially affected? Are income inequalities 
exacerbated or weakened? 
4. How does the agreement affect those willing 
and able to migrate? 
∎ What attitudes to migration are found in the 
olive-growing regions? Are these more remote 
regions with stable social structures where people 
tend to be less mobile? 
∎ Are there other factors in the region that affect 
migration? Is the internal situation stable? What 
is the political situation concerning criminality, 
the social situation concerning levels of inequali-
ty or the ecological situation concerning rainfall 
and environmental conditions? Does an existing 
diaspora increase the tendency to migrate? 
5. Broader circumstances 
∎ Is Tunisia’s democratisation process succeeding? 
And are economic and political stability and rule 
of law strengthened? 
∎ Will the EU’s economic perspectives permit in-
creasing imports from Tunisia? 
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important export sector for the EU, lending it an 
offensive interest in further liberalisation in this area. 
The EU accounts for 22 percent of global trade in 
services (United States 15 percent, China 8 percent) 
and has a positive balance of trade exceeding €150 
billion/year.70 If it wants to expand its service exports, 
the EU will certainly have to demonstrate more flex-
ibility on Mode 4. This is because presence of natural 
persons to supply services in the EU is the most im-
portant offensive trade interest in the area of services 
for many partner countries, at least on a temporary 
basis. The European Commission assumes that this 
issue will remain on the agenda. Additionally, the 
EU’s immigration rules will have to be coordinated 
more closely in order to ensure that the market access 
granted to trading partners under free trade agree-
ments can actually be realised,71 given that the EU’s 
administrative and visa conditions are decisive for 
whether those supplying services abroad can actually 
make use of trade preferences granted. Caribbean 
states have complained about this in no uncertain 
terms in relation to their economic partnership agree-
ment with the EU.72 For instance if a businessperson 
requires separate visas for different EU countries, this 
not only increases the time and cost involved, but 
also complicates scheduling. “[D]evising schemes to 
fulfil trade commitments and facilitating the admis-
sion of third-country nationals for business purposes” 
is therefore high up the Commission’s agenda.73 The 
language makes it clear that the EU is talking prin-
cipally about facilitating access for highly skilled 
workers (“professionals”). 
So which aspects will need to be considered if the 
EU wishes to expand market access under Mode 4 in 
order to satisfy partner countries’ demands in trade 
talks? First of all, there are important arguments for 
addressing the topic of Mode 4 in bilateral or regional 
contexts rather than multilaterally in the WTO. Mar-
ket opening at WTO level is comparatively difficult to 
achieve, because it must apply to all trading partners 
under the most-favoured nation principle (although 
exceptions are possible). The context of free trade 
agreements is more conducive to defining groups of 
 
70 European Commission, Fitness Check on EU Legislation on 
Legal Migration (see note 44), 188. 
71 Ibid., 151. 
72 See Schmieg, Trade and Investment Agreements for Sustain-
able Development? (see note 68). 
73 European Commission, Fitness Check on EU Legislation on 
Legal Migration (see note 44), 188. 
service providers for which access is to be eased in 
the economic and social interest. Additionally, the 
smaller number of parties means that the scope of 
application is more clearly identifiable. 
Because of the brain drain issue, which represents 
a considerable drag on the development opportunities 
of poorer countries, as well as public resistance in 
receiving countries, it is recommended – at least at 
first – to enable migration on a temporary or circu-
lar basis. “Circular migration” – where (labour) mi-
grants return at least once to their country of origin 
before relocating again to the destination country – 
could make a contribution to know-how transfer to 
developing countries without causing brain drain and 
at the same time accommodate the labour needs of 
ageing societies in the EU. The development idea – 
that circular migration is in the interests of country of 
origin, destination country and of the migrants them-
selves – corresponds to the basic understanding of 
circular migration.74 
For their part, developing countries are advised to 
link the access they concede for foreign direct invest-
ment (an import under Mode 3), to their own demand 
for market access under Mode 4. The countries of 
origin of investments could for example commit to 
enabling temporary migration for the purpose of in-
house training. In particular in relation to the de-
mands of the global labour market, working for a 
period at the headquarters of a multinational co-
operation would grant employees from developing 
countries the opportunity to expand their knowledge 
and experience.75 Although such conditions are pro-
hibited under the WTO Agreement on Trade Related 
Investment Measures (TRIMS), GATS, whose Mode 3 
applies to commercial presence, does permit national 
restrictions in the schedules. In their own self-interest 
developing countries should make more use of these 
flexibilities. 
The connection between investment and tempo-
rary migration of employees could also be strength-
ened by closer cooperation between governments in 
host countries and the private sector in countries of 
origin. UNCTAD proposes establishing platforms for 
dialogue and information exchange between private 
sector and government,76 in order to generate employ-
 
74 European Commission, Fitness Check on EU Legislation on 
Legal Migration (see note 44). 
75 Panizzon, Trade and Labor Migration (see note 34), 26. 
76 UNCTAD, Migration for Structural Transformation 
(see note 16), 154. 
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ment creation projects and counter the negative per-
ceptions of migration. German business has launched 
an initiative (“Afrika kommt!” or “Africa is coming!”) 
to bring successful young Africans to work in German 
companies for a limited time.77 Such initiatives could 
be productively linked to the implementation of free 
trade agreements, where cooperation is also required 
with the businesses that are supposed to be making 
use of the new opportunities. 
It would also be conceivable for the EU to include 
the topic of migration in future trade agreements, 
with a conditionality tying restrictions on migration 
to incentives for trade. Signs of this are found in the 
Fitness Check Migration, which states: “Trade policy 
should take into account the policy framework for 
the return and readmission of irregular migrants,”78 
without further concretising the point. 
Conditionality already features in the EU’s trade 
policy (although not in relation to migration) in the 
Generalised System of Preferences Plus (GPS+), which 
was designed as an incentive system for sustainable 
development and good governance. It reduces import 
tariffs to zero for “vulnerable” low and lower middle 
income countries that implement twenty-seven inter-
national conventions in the areas of human rights, 
labour rights, environmental protection and good 
governance. Unilateral trade preferences are thus 
used to reward countries that make special efforts 
to improve social and ecological sustainability. 
The United States also uses negative conditionality 
in its preference system, to enforce its own foreign 
policy objectives. The US African Growth and Oppor-
tunity Act (Washington’s system of preferences for 
states in sub-Saharan Africa) thus grants privileges 
only to countries that refrain from engaging in “activ-
ities that undermine United States national security 
or foreign policy interests”.79 In practice the instru-
ment is used to threaten countries with withdrawal 
of AGOA trade preferences if they move to apply 
tariffs that would also affect American exports. This 
occurred in 2018 for example, when East African 
 
77 See the initiative’s website: https://afrika-kommt.de/ 
(accessed 23 January 2019). 
78 European Commission, Fitness Check on EU Legislation on 
Legal Migration (see note 44), 150. 
79 AGOA Country Eligibility, AGOA.info/tralac, https://agoa. 
info/about-agoa/country-eligibility.html (accessed 2 July 
2019). 
countries proposed banning imports of used cloth-
ing.80 
Including sanctions against irregular 
migration would undermine 
the fundamental concept of 
trade agreements. 
Fundamentally it would be possible to apply migra-
tion-related conditionalities to trade agreements, for 
example in relation to returning irregular migrants. 
Conditionality could even be linked to trade sanc-
tions, such as the reinstatement of tariffs, via the dis-
pute settlement system that is part of every EU trade 
agreement. However, instrumentalising trade policy 
for purposes of migration policy would undermine the 
stability and predictability of the international trade 
framework, and as such contradict the central objec-
tive of trade agreements. It would also mean the EU 
abandoning its line of not using sanction instruments 
in trade agreements to enforce foreign policy goals. 
 
80 Susanne Maria Kraus, “Ostafrika kämpft weiter gegen 
Second-Hand-Kleidung”, Deutsche Welle, 26 March 2018, 
https://www.dw.com/de/ostafrika-k%C3%A4mpft-weiter-
gegen-second-hand-kleidung/a-42744807 (accessed 23 Sep-
tember 2019). 
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The question of the extent to which trade policy is 
connected to migration is especially relevant for 
Europe in relation to Africa. Although the European 
Union remains Africa’s most important trade partner, 
its predominance has waned. In 1995 the members of 
today’s EU still accounted for more than 40 percent of 
Africa’s exports; by 2018 the figure had fallen below 
25 percent.81 Africa is not a major trading region for 
the EU, with a share of 7.1 percent of EU imports and 
7.5 percent of exports (2018) – even if the absolute 
volume (exports and imports) has roughly tripled 
since year 2000 (to about $350 billion, €307 billion).82 
More than half of the imports came from just four 
countries (South Africa, Algeria, Nigeria and Moroc-
co). Sub-Saharan Africa accounts for just 3.7 percent 
of the EU’s international trade. To this day the EU 
principally imports raw materials from Africa (with 
the exception of Morocco) and exports principally 
manufactured and processed goods. In other words, 
trade between the EU and African states is asymmet-
rical. And trade provisions differ depending on coun-
try and region (see map). 
Migration from Africa, on the other hand, has 
become an increasingly important issue for the EU. 
Legal immigration from Africa to Europe was in fact 
falling until 2012, since when it has remained broadly 
constant (2016: 288,000). But the numbers of asylum-
seekers migrating via irregular channels have spiked, 
from less than 100,000 per year (until 2013) to more 
than 200,000 in 2016, largely from Sub-Saharan Africa.83 
 
81 UNCTAD, UNCTADstat. 
82 Eurostat, Africa-EU – Key Statistical Indicators (November 
2018), https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/ 
index.php/Africa-EU_-_key_statistical_indicators# 
International_trade (accessed 12 February 2019). 
83 European Commission, Many More to Come? (see note 19), 15f. 
On the basis of the above discussion, two questions 
are especially relevant for assessing EU trade instru-
ments for Africa and their effects on migration: 
(1) Does the question of migration play a role in EU 
trade instruments? This may relate to both irregular 
migration and associated issues such as repatriation, 
as well as questions of legal migration and market 
opening for service providers. (2) Do the details of the 
trade provisions promise a contribution to sustainable 
development and to creating future prospects? 
Association Agreements with 
North African states 
The EU is linked to the states of North Africa by asso-
ciation agreements concluded under the Euro-Medi-
terranean Partnership (indicated in yellow on the map). 
In the scope of the Partnership the EU has free trade 
agreements – largely restricted to trade in manufac-
tured goods – with all countries apart from Syria and 
Libya.84 The EU has also discussed with Morocco and 
Tunisia the possibility of incorporating wider issues 
and negotiating deep free trade agreements, including 
steps towards market opening for services and agri-
culture. Talks Tunisia are ongoing, but those with 
Morocco are on hold (as of autumn 2019).85 
 
84 European Commission, Euro-Mediterranean Partnership 
(last update: 7 May 2019), http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/ 
countries-and-regions/regions/euro-mediterranean-
partnership/ (accessed 12 February 2019). 
85 European Commission, Overview of FTA and Other Trade 
Negotiations (last update: July 2019), http://trade.ec.europa.eu/ 
doclib/docs/2006/december/tradoc_118238.pdf (accessed 
16 August 2019). 
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The agreements to date contain no market opening 
for services and Mode 4, although that is being nego-
tiated with Tunisia. In parallel, and supplementing 
negotiations for trade liberalisation, talks are held 
about easier access to short-term visas, and “proce-
dures for the readmission of irregular migrants”.86 As 
such the talks hew to the objective of the EU’s Trade 
Strategy and its Fitness Check Migration: to improve coher-
ence between the policy areas of trade and migration. 
To assess the extent to which the agreements 
with North African states can contribute to long-term 
development perspectives, the first issue is whether 
the market access granted to trading partners does in 
fact correspond to their comparative advantages (in 
other words, offering real opportunities). Because the 
opening for agriculture in existing association agree-
ments is very limited, important export products 
remain excluded. North African countries would wel-
come a significant market opening for products such 
as olive oil and tomatoes for example, but the burden 
of such concessions would fall disproportionately on 
the EU’s Mediterranean member states, which are 
already struggling economically. Such a move would 
therefore demand a quid pro quo in the scope of 
European solidarity.87 Services too, where Tunisia has 
an interest in Mode 4, offers potential for expansion. 
The agreements with Mediterranean countries and 
regions were concluded between 1995 (Israel and 
Tunisia) and 2002 (Lebanon and Algeria).88 As such 
they originate from an era when sustainability-related 
aspects such as workers’ rights, environmental stand-
ards and civil society participation did not yet play 
the role in trade talks that they do today. The current 
negotiations with Tunisia create an opportunity not 
only to correct this but also, through asymmetry and 
flexible safeguard and review clauses, to strengthen 
the role of sustainable development aspects in the 
agreements. 
 
86 European Commission, “The EU and Tunisia Start Nego-
tiations on Visa Facilitation and Readmission”, press release 
(Brussels, 12 October 2016), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_IP-16-3394_en.htm (accessed 20 June 2019). 
87 See also Schmieg, “Europäische Handelspolitik” 
(see note 1), 38. 
88 European Commission, Euro-Mediterranean Partnership 
(see note 84). 
Economic Partnership Agreements with 
African ACP States 
The EU has concluded Economic Partnership Agree-
ments with African states and regions from the ACP 
group (the African, Caribbean and Pacific states), 
which currently comprises seventy-nine states (in-
dicated in light green in the map, p. 27).89 In these 
asymmetrical agreements the partner countries open 
up to 80 percent of their markets for EU products 
while the EU grants them completely tariff- and duty-
free access for all goods. The Economic Partnership 
Agreements were intended to replace the previous 
unilateral EU trade preferences with a system that con-
forms to WTO rules, and to serve the topline goals of 
“sustainable development” and “regional integration 
of partner countries”. Market access conditions for 
South Africa differ, even though it belongs to the EPA 
with the members of the SADC. This special status is 
due to its higher level of development, and it does not 
receive completely free access to the EU market. 
The agreements say nothing specific on the topic 
of migration. The question of services is also excluded 
to date. The European Union had originally proposed 
concluding deep trade agreements whose scope ex-
tended beyond trade in goods. This was rejected by 
the African states, partly out of concern that their 
limited negotiating capacities would leave them 
unable to keep track of the possible repercussions. 
The EU’s EPAs with African countries therefore re-
main restricted to trade in goods; services, and thus 
also Mode 4, are excluded. But the possibility does 
exist to negotiate additional topics at a later date, 
at which point the partner countries could raise 
demands on Mode 4. The EPA region of eastern and 
southern Africa (implemented by Madagascar, Mau-
ritius, Seychelles and Zimbabwe) has in the interim 
started talks with the EU about potentially deepening 
the agreement to include services.90 
The EPAs are free trade agreements whose provi-
sions largely satisfy the requirements of sustainable 
development. At least in theory they can thus con-
tribute in the long term to addressing the causes of 
 
89 European Commission, Economic Partnerships (last update: 
21 February 2019, http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-
and-regions/development/economic-partnerships/ (accessed 
20 June 2019). 
90 European Commission, Overview of Economic Partnership 
Agreements (last update: July 2019), http://trade.ec.europa.eu/ 
doclib/docs/2009/september/tradoc_144912.pdf (accessed 
25 September 2019). 
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migration. Through tariff- and duty-free access to the 
EU market they offer partner countries the oppor-
tunity to market all their export products – includ-
ing processed agricultural products – to Europe. 
The asymmetry of the EPAs permits partner coun-
tries to exclude sensitive products from liberalisation. 
They include monitoring mechanisms and dialogue 
forums which also bring in civil society actors. A 
series of precautions were instituted to tackle prob-
lematic import trends that could lead to unemploy-
ment and to promote food security and industrial 
development.91 No other North-South agreement 
contains comparable flexibilities for achieving its 
development objectives. 
However, these agreements also need to prove in 
practice that they can satisfy the needs of the partici-
pating countries. The proposed monitoring mecha-
nisms need to be rapidly established, capable of 
detecting problems quickly and equipped to initiate 
any protective measures deemed necessary. Moreover, 
labour and environmental provisions in these EPAs 
have remained rudimentary (at the insistence of the 
African partners). These topics should be put on the 
table again in subsequent negotiating rounds – in-
cluding the current talks with the countries of eastern 
and southern Africa. In order to ensure that the part-
ners can actually make use of the opportunities cre-
ated by the agreements, despite their scarcity of funds 
and human resources, they need to be backed by aid 
for trade measures. 
Unilateral Trade Preferences 
The EU’s Generalised System of Preferences (GSP) 
grants privileged market access to all low- and lower-
middle-income countries. Under this system their 
exports in about two-thirds of tariff lines are subject 
to reduced or zero tariffs.92 For the African middle-
income countries the GSP is economically irrelevant 
because it offers much worse market access than the 
Economic Partnership Agreements. For this reason 
 
91 Bettina Rudloff and Evita Schmieg, “European Chicken 
Drumsticks for West Africa – A Threat to Local Markets?” 
Rural21 51, no. 1 (2017): 15–17, https://www.rural21.com/ 
fileadmin/downloads/2017/en-01/Rural21_1_2017_v11.pdf 
(accessed 24 June 2019). 
92 European Commission, Generalised Scheme of Preferences 
(GSP) (last update: 24 May 2019), http://ec.europa.eu/trade/ 
policy/countries-and-regions/development/generalised-
scheme-of-preferences/index_en.htm (accessed 28 June 2019). 
most countries in this income group implement an 
EPA (the few exceptions including Nigeria).93 Imports 
from the poorest countries – the LDCs – are com-
pletely exempt from tariffs and quotas under the 
Everything But Arms initiative of the GSP (shaded red 
on the map, p. 27). The EU is to date the only region 
to offer the poorest countries completely free market 
access – even though WTO member states agreed at 
the 2005 WTO Ministerial Conference in Hong Kong it 
should be granted by all industrialised countries and 
emerging economies. 
The GSP leaves the topic of migration to one side. 
It makes no mention of services, and thus has no 
bearing their provision by natural persons; all it does 
is grant trade preferences for goods. Nor does the 
European GSP presently contain other migration-
related provisions or conditionalities. 
The EU does however grant the LDCs unilateral 
preferences under the WTO’s services waiver, also for 
Mode 4.94 It enables, for example, contractual services 
suppliers in twenty-six fields – including accounting, 
architecture and environmental services – as well as 
independent professionals in eleven areas to pursue 
limited activity within the EU. Relevant activities are 
subject to a string of conditions. For example a firm 
that wishes to send staff to the EU must have existed 
for at least one year; the worker in question must 
have been employed by the firm for at least one year 
and must be able to demonstrate three years’ pro-
fessional experience. Independent professionals can 
operate for a maximum of six months in the EU 
(25 weeks in Luxembourg). There are also additional 
restrictions such as needs assessments. The qualifica-
tion requirements are mostly tied to the respective 
national equivalents in the EU member states and 
access is restricted to degree-holders. Altogether this 
is likely to mean that the actual utility of the scheme 
for the LDCs will remain extremely limited. The same 
also applies to this instrument’s relevance to migration. 
 
93 Explaining the complicated history of the EPA negotia-
tions is beyond the scope of this study, as is the question 
of why particular countries participate while others do not. 
See, for example, Evita Schmieg, “Außenhandel für nach-
haltige Entwicklung? Freihandelsabkommen zwischen der 
EU und dem globalen Süden”, Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte 68, 
no. 4–5 (2018): 40–46. 
94 See WTO, Council for Trade in Services, Notification from 
the European Union, S/C/N840 (18 November 2015), http://trade. 
ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/november/tradoc_153997.pdf 
(accessed 12 February 2019). 
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Trade policy instruments play virtually no direct role 
in limiting migration flows. Empirical observations 
reveal that increasing trade stimulates migration in 
the short and medium term. To that extent it is im-
portant to distinguish between flight and migration. 
In the long term trade can contribute to combating 
causes of flight whose grounds lie in poverty. To that 
end trade agreements should be shaped in such a 
way as to contribute to sustainable development. All 
existing agreements with African states and regions 
leave room for improvement in this respect. Talks are 
currently under way with Tunisia, and all the Eco-
nomic Partnership Agreements permit the inclusion 
of new topics. But the final shape of any agreement 
depends on the partner countries as well as the EU. 
Opening the EU market to products that can 
actually be exported from the partner countries is 
central if an agreement is to promote sustainable 
development and help to combat causes of flight in 
the long term. Because the EU has already completely 
opened its market to Sub-Saharan Africa, this is rele-
vant only to South Africa and the countries of North 
Africa. 
But increasing trade will probably at the same time 
encourage migration, above all by the better-educated. 
Possibilities of legal migration can reduce the incen-
tive for people to migrate illegally in search of a 
better life. It lies in the interests of all participating 
countries to manage these processes in ways that 
ensure that their effects are positive for all involved. 
Developing countries want better access to the mar-
kets of the EU and other industrialised countries for 
their service providers, above all in association with 
the prospect that these individuals will return with 
new skills and make a contribution to development 
in their country of origin. Industrialised countries, 
especially those with ageing societies, have tangible 
labour needs in multiple service sectors. Active use 
of Mode 4 in negotiations on services is therefore suit-
able for creating legal possibilities for migration and 
balancing the interests of countries of origin and des-
tination. To this end a determined linkage of migra-
tion and trade policy instruments is recommended. 
Closer cooperation with the private sector would also 
be helpful. The point is not only to agree which ser-
vice sectors should be opened. The private sector can 
also be involved in longer-term processes of circular 
migration, for example by participating in local voca-
tional training and offering internships and training 
in the parent company. 
Numerous factors lead people to leave their home-
land. Some of them, such as the ability to obtain in-
formation about possible destination countries, have 
steadily improved during recent years with the pro-
gress in information and communications technology. 
Additionally, globalisation processes and prior migra-
tion flows mean that many people already live out-
side their country of origin, which makes it easier for 
those who follow. Trade policy is only one influenc-
ing factor among many, and its possible role in migra-
tion management must not be overestimated. Never-
theless, there is every reason to take the topic of migra-
tion into account when formulating trade policy, espe-
cially with regard to legal possibilities of migration 
and their utilisation in the mutual interest. This will 
be the EU’s task in the coming years, since the topic 
of Mode 4 is only going to become more important. 
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Abbreviations 
ACP African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States 
CEN-SAD Communauté des États Sahálo-Sahariens/ 
Community of Sahel-Saharan States 
COMESA Common Market for Eastern and Southern 
Africa 
EPA Economic Partnership Agreement (EU) 
GATS General Agreement on Trade in Services 
GDP Gross domestic product 
GSP Generalised System of Preferences 
ILO International Labour Organisation 
IOM International Organisation for Migration 
LDC Least developed country 
OECD Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development 
SADC Southern African Development Community 
TRIMS Trade-Related Investment Measures 
UNCTAD United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development 
WTO World Trade Organisation 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
